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ABSTRACT 
 
We investigate whether access to different financial capital sources offers competitive advantages 
in China's highly regulated market. To identify sources and analyze financial capital relationships 
that affect competitive advantages, we study 6750 firm-year observations from 2000-2009. Firms 
gain competitive advantages when they can access internal and external financing in equities, 
bonds and equity-financed capital. Financial industry reforms benefit large private and 
government-owned firms. Regional institutional developments help to access sources of external 
financial capital. Implications include the need to mobilize external financial resources for small 
and private firms and further reform security regulations to ensure fair competition and 
sustainability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
elationships between firm resources and performance attract much research interest even though 
little is known about why some firms use resources successfully and others do not (Helfat 2000). 
Extant literature suggests that superior performance comes from resource uniqueness (Barney 1991), 
reconfiguration and integration of existing resources (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, Teece et al. 1997), and the ability 
to respond appropriately to the environment (Mintzberg 1987, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Tan and Litsschert 1994). 
Scholars suggest that strategy and performance depend largely on the accessibility, timing, and amount of financial 
resources during development and new investments. Financial resources enable or constrain the strategic decision-
making abilities of entrepreneurs and managers (Gilbert et al. 2006, Pissarides 1999, Zou et al. 2010). However, 
many researchers ignore access to different sources of financial capital as a crucial factor that offers competitive 
advantage. In this study, we analyze the financial capital impact on competitive advantages by focusing on a highly 
regulated market with large institutional and regional disparity regarding resource access. 
 
Resource theorists suggest that a firm differs from another due to differences in sources of advantage (Peng 
2009) and strategic orientations (Zhou and Li 2010). Institutional theorists claim that sources of competitive 
advantage are discovered due to differences in institution frameworks (DiMaggio and Powell 1999, North 1990, 
Oliver 1997, Peng 2002, Scott 1995). Firms have different levels of access to sources of financial capital because of 
variations in institutional frameworks. The China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) heavily regulates 
financing activities, so Chinese firms have unequal rights to finance and equity capital and bonds. Firms in other 
countries such as the US must fully and truthfully disclose information before financing operations. A regulatory 
R 
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 facilitates only fair disclosures and information flow. In comparison, China’s strict regulations create 
dissimilar access to equity capital and bonds, so that some firms have better financial access than others (Li 2009).  
 
China maintains a government-dominated financial system in which the government tightly controls entry 
to banking and other financial services (Allen et al. 2008, Fan et al. 2008) and Chinese listed firms rely strongly on 
bank loan finance (Firth et al. 2008). Privately held companies have difficultly accessing bank credit (Linton 2006). 
Government banks differentially favor politically connected firms by providing them greater access to credit 
(Khwaja and Mian, 2005). China’s politicians and bureaucrats strongly influence the allocation of bank loans: state 
ownership of banks means state control over most financial resources (Fan et al. 2008). The banking sector has 
undergone management reforms in the pursuit of maximizing value; thus, inland and coastal firms encounter 
difficulty in obtaining external loans (Sun and Yamori 2009). Hence, it is crucial to know how institutional 
differences such as formal structures, regional institutional developments, and regulation impact access to difference 
sources of financial capital and affect comparative advantages. 
 
First, we address how neglected financial resources affect competitive advantage in a highly regulated 
market with a weak institutional environment. Second, we study how regulatory regimes and institutional 
developments influence financing, and to what extent regulations of institutional environment create an advantage 
for firms, and in what ways they affect competitive advantage in a highly regulated market.  
 
CHINA’S INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
Studies have established dimensions of the institutional environment in China’s transitional economy: 
capital market, labor market, product markets, government regulations, and contract enforcements (Khanna and 
Palepu 1997); political, legal and regulatory effects (Newman 2000); and regulatory, political, and financial effects 
(Li and Ferreira 2011). Governments in many transition countries control key resources because of the lingering 
legacy of the command economy and slow development of market-supporting institutions (Li et al. 2008). Private 
entrepreneurs in transition economies face many obstacles. They are often denied access to bank loans and other key 
resources that are largely reserved for SOEs or are subject to heavy government regulations or “extralegal” fees 
(Guriev, 2004, Johnson et al. 2000, McMillan & Woodruff, 2002).  
 
By promulgating and enforcing economic policies and regulations, governments can directly change 
competitive environments (Hillman et al. 1999, Mahon and Murray 1981, Shaffer 1995). Government regulations 
create external uncertainties for the firm’s operations (Lang and Lockhart 1990) and restrict capabilities for 
acquiring external resources (Khawaja and Mian 2005). In China, compared with more-developed countries, the 
state holds a significant stake and greatly influences company operations, exerting enormous power in resource 
allocation and regulation enforcement (Nee 1992, Peng 1997, Tsai 2008, Wu and Cheng 2011). SOEs enjoy 
preferential status in obtaining bank loans and other key inputs (Brandt and Li 2003, Che 2002, Chow et al. 2010, Li 
et al. 2008, Poncet et al. 2010), while private firms are often denied access to bank loans (Brandt and Li 2003, 
McMillan 1997, Nee 1992). Government struggles to create fair market conditions so that private firms can compete 
(Li et al. 2008). 
 
In regions where marketization processes are moving more rapidly, as noted, government intervention is 
reduced and legal environments are stronger. Better institutional and legal environments in regions have faster 
marketization (Fan et al. 2009), but various Chinese regions have very different historical and geographical 
conditions and policies (Du and Xiu 2009). China’s market-supporting institutions are imperfect and likely to 
remain flawed (Li et al. 2008). Market reforms have yielded decisive progress, but large institutional development 
gaps still exist regionally (Fen et al. 2003). Listed firms in China show conspicuous regional disparities; eastern and 
coastal regions are rich, while western and central regions are poor because China’s long-term unbalanced 
development strategy gave priority to the eastern and coastal regions (Sun and Yamori 2009).  
 
Chinese Regulatory Requirements for External Financing 
 
Chinese firms face more constrained financial resources in the areas of market economies, performance, 
and competitive advantage (Peng and Heat 1996). CSRC regulations and bureaucrats have more power than the 
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developed market, then, to favor some firms and discriminate against others by influencing their access to sources of 
capital and finance. China’s regulatory regime restricts Chinese firms in their ability to obtain funds through the 
financial markets. Its regulations define which firms can access different sources of financial capital and which firms 
can achieve both competitive and sustained competitive advantages. In this paper, we explore the relation between 
access to difference sources of financial capital and competitive advantage that may be created by government-
CSRC regulation and other institutional differences. The CSRC regulates the issuance of securities, primarily 
determining their regulatory requirements by firm-based quantitative and qualitative criteria. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the historical evolution of the main quantitative criteria (Appendix for a complete listing). 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 
External analysis of competitive advantage focuses on idiosyncratic firm attributes as they impact 
competitiveness (Porter 1990). Such analysis isolates characteristics, or resources, that exploit opportunities and 
neutralize threats (Barney 1991). External analysis is based on two assumptions concerning idiosyncratic firm 
resources. First, competitive advantage assumes that firms within an industry control identical strategically relevant 
resources and pursue the same strategies (Porter 1981, Rumelt 1984). Second, industries develop resources 
heterogenically but for the short-term because the resources are highly mobile (Barney 1986). Such analyses assume 
that firms have the same resources for implementing strategies or have the same access to resources for achieving 
competitive advantage. In line with this analysis, we argue that regulations and weak institutional environments can 
also create a competitive advantage for firms that have the same resources but different levels of access to resources, 
that is, financial capital, for implementing strategies. 
 
The concept of RBV competitive advantage is based on the link between a firm’s internal characteristics 
and performance (Rumelt 1984). In addition to internal competencies that generate competitive advantages, external 
factors also affect RBV (Collis and Montgomery, 1995). Most industries probably possess at least some degree of 
resource heterogeneity and immobility (Barney and Hoskisson, 1990). They cannot expect to obtain sustained 
competitive advantage when all competing firms have evenly distributed strategic resources (Barney 1991). Across 
firms in China, access to financial resources is uneven and mobility is imperfect. China’s weak financial 
infrastructure makes it difficult for most Chinese firms to raise capital. (Ju and Zhao 2009, Peng et al. 2010).  
 
In addition to firm- and industry- levels characteristics, scholars suggest that firms must consider wider 
state and social influences when designing and implementing strategies (DiMaggio and Powell 1999, Oliver 1997, 
Peng 2002). These influences are considered broadly to be the institutional framework (North 1990, Scott 1995), a 
perspective applied to strategic research regarding the IBV of business strategy theory (Peng 2002, Peng and Heath, 
1996).  Hence, researchers must study institutional frameworks: how, why, and when they matter (Powell, 1996).   
 
Institution theory provides strong insight for studies of business in developing countries (Peng, Wang and 
Jiang 2008, Peng et al. 2009) and Asia (Hoskission et al. 2000). Asia’s emerging economy is not uniform, and its 
formal institutions fall short of supporting low-transaction-cost business operations in three critical areas: credible 
legal framework, stable political structure, and functioning strategic market factors (Khanna and Palepu 1997, Peng 
2002, Peng and Heath 1996). From business’s viewpoint, institutional literature focuses on formal laws, rules, and 
regulations, (La Porta et al. 2008). Underdevelopment of formal institutions in emerging economies causes much 
uncertainty regarding supply and demand conditions and sudden changes in government policies (Hoskission et al. 
2000, Wright et al. 2005).  Formal institutions encourage market competition, reduce information issues, and 
enhance legal effectiveness (Zhou and Peng 2010). In developed economies, specialized organizations such as stock 
markets, research firms, law firms, and courts ― as a collection of formal institutions ― handle costly activities 
including allocating capital, obtaining information, and enforcing contacts (Peng 2002).  
 
We investigate how CSRS’s regulation for external financing, institutional developments affect competitive 
advantage and what sources of financial capital and finance offer competitive advantage in a highly regulated 
market. The RBV fails to adequately consider context; in one context, valuable, rare, inimitable resources and 
capabilities are non-valuable; in another they are plentiful and easily imitated (Peng et al. 2009). We study both 
RBV and IBV and find support for the underlying mechanisms that relate institutions to organizational strategies 
and link them to performance. 
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Table 1. Summary regulations on external financing in China 
Date Rights Issues Seasoned Equity Issues Corporate Bond Issues Convertible Bond Issues 
1993/11/17 
 
2 years’ of profitability  
 
 
Not permitted. 
 Firm is a state-owned 
enterprise. 
 ROE > 0 in x consecutive 
years prior to the issue. 
 
 
Not permitted. 1994/10/30 3 years’ of profitability and 3-
year average ROE ≥ 10% 
1996/01/24 
 
ROE ≥ 10% in each of the 
previous 3 years 
1997/03/25 
 
  Firm is a state-owned enterprise. 
 3-year average ROE ≥ 10% & ROE ≥ 10% in 
the previous year. 
  Assets-liability ratio shall not be more than 
70% after issue. 
  Total bond balance shall not exceed 40% of 
book equity. 
  Issue shall be not less than 100 million RMB.. 
1999/03/17 
 
3-year average ROE ≥ 10% & 
ROE ≥ 6% in each of the 
previous 3 years 2000/04/30 
 
ROE ≥ 0% in each of the previous 3 years 
2001/03/15 
 
3-year average ROE ≥ 6%  3-year average ROE ≥ 6%  
2001/04/26  3-year average ROE ≥ 10% & ROE ≥ 10% in 
the previous year. 
  Assets-liability ratio shall not be more than 
70% after issue. 
  Total bond balance shall not exceed 40% of 
book equity. 
 Issue shall be not less than 100 million RMB. 
2002/07/24 
 
 3-year average ROE ≥ 10% & ROE ≥ 
10% in  the previous  year 
 Total value of this issue shall be less the 
book equity at the end of last year. 
 Assets-liability ratio of the previous year 
before issue shall not be less than the 
average level of listed firms in the same 
industry. 
2006/01/01 
 Book equity ≥ 30 million 
RMB. 
 Total bond balance does 
not exceed 40% of book 
equity. 
 The 3-year average 
distributable profits are 
sufficient to cover 
interest on bonds. 
2006/05/08  ROE ≥ 0% in each of the 
previous 3 years 
 Operating earnings shall not 
have declined more than 50% 
in last issue year if the firm 
had an issue (including equity 
and bond over the last 2 years. 
  Total cash or stock dividends 
of last 3 years should be more 
than 20% of average net 
distributable earnings of last 3 
years. 
 3-year average ROE ≥ 6%  
 Operating earnings shall not have 
declined more than 50% in last issue year 
if the firm had an issue (including equity 
and bond over the last 2 years. 
  Total cash or stock dividends of last 3 
years should be more than 20% of 
average net distributable earnings of last 
3 years. 
 3-year average ROE ≥ 6%. 
 Total bond balance shall not exceed 40% of 
book equity. 
 Operating earnings shall not have declined more 
than 50% in last issue year if the firm had an 
issue (including equity and bond over the last 2 
years. 
  Total cash or stock dividends of last 3 years 
should be more than 20% of average net 
distributable earnings of last 3 years. 
 Last three years average distributable profits are 
sufficient to cover interest on corporate bonds. 
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The ability to raise external capital is an important capability (Peng 2009), especially critical for Malaysian 
biotechnology firms (Ahn and Yoke 2011). Access to equity capital is an important capability that firms need in at 
least four situations: (1) to finance cash flows resulting from payment delays; (2) to obtain bank guarantees; (3) to 
invest in capacity expansion and other developments; and (4) to provide cushioning during economic recession 
(Vorasubin and Chareonngam 2007). According to corporate finance literature, ‘since IPOs raise funds to expand 
and compete more effectively, they gain competitive advantage over rivals (Akhigbe et al. 2003, p. 532) and 
‘publicly listed industry peers’ (Hsu et al. 2010, p. 496).  
 
We focus on Chinese listed firms that raise external capital from SEOs. They can obtain equity capital 
through existing shareholders (right offerings) and/or the public (public offerings). In China, firms must meet 
regulation requirements before an SEO, and they have unequal rights when raising capital through secondary public 
and rights share offerings. Equity financing represents a luxury available only to a few listed Chinese firms, 
although the ability to issue shares is a valuable intangible asset (Zou and Xiao 2006). Young firms possessing rich 
equity capital during developmental periods enjoy many advantages, perform better, and exploit resources from rich 
market niches (Lee et al. 2001). Biomedical firms experiencing a lack of equity capital while pursuing significant 
technological breakthroughs perform more poorly than firms that have enough equity capital for technological 
developments (Roberts and Hauptman 1987). These agreements lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  A firm that has better access to equity capital has (a) a higher level of competitive advantage and (b) 
a higher level of sustained competitive advantage. 
 
Vorasubin and Chareonngam (2007) demonstrate that access to debt financing is a vital source of financial 
capital. They examine unlisted construction firms, but omit access to the bond market, which is outside the scope of 
their study. Generally, bonds are a low-cost debt-financing option, but development of the Chinese bond market is 
far behind the stock market (Hirson 2005, Leung and Young 2002) and is the smallest corporate bond market in East 
Asia (Linton 2006). Corporate bonds issuance became more liberal after 1999. Still, all firms unable to freely issue 
bonds because first they must meet CSRC’s regulation criteria, and they have unequal debt-financing bond rights. 
Hence, firms have preferential access to bond finance may obtain adequate investment funds when needed to gain 
competitive advantage. 
 
Corporate bond can substitute for a bank loan, which reduces over-reliance on bank loans and enables firms 
to acquire long-term debt capital directly. Although the ability to issue bonds is a valuable intangible financial-asset, 
Chinese firms possess unequal rights regarding bonds. The bond market has, however, been changing dramatically 
in the transition from a command to a market economy (Huang and Song 2006). An accelerated bond market 
expands financial channels for listed companies. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  A firm that has higher ability to access bond capital has (a) a higher level of competitive advantage 
and (b) has a higher level of sustained competitive advantage. 
 
A vital source of financial capital is access to bank financing at a competitively lower cost than the primary 
competitors (Vorasubin and Chareonngam 2007). Firms with better access to bank financing assume much lower 
interest rates under better terms. Before the late 1990s, bank financing was a primary financing source for Chinese 
firms (Ma, 1998) and is still a main source of debt finance because bond financing is inadequate (Fazzari et al. 1988, 
Leung and Young, 2002), so competition is high for bank financing with better terms. Firms with better access to 
bank financing are better able to manage trade credit and are more likely to gain advantage from early-payment 
discounts and avoid late-payment penalties (Uzzi and Gillapsi 2002). However, Chinese firms over rely on bank 
loans to meet their financing needs (Linton 2006). Before recent banking reforms, banks acted as government agents 
that distributed funds to preapproved projects with little to no collateral and without proper credit analysis. After 
reform, commercial banks granted loans under commercial terms, including SOEs; local governments and 
government officials were forbidden to interfere with banks in their lending decisions (Peiser and Wang 2002). 
These arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Firms that have better and easier access to bank financing have (a) a higher level of competitive 
advantage and (b) a higher level of sustained competitive advantage. 
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The ability to generate internal funds is an important source of financial capital (Peng 2009, Wang 2010). A 
firm that is better able to raise internal funds enjoys competitive advantage by reducing financing costs and self-
financing highly profitable investments. Debt instruments are difficult to acquire because of problems in forecasting 
how much capital is needed and how long it will take to realize intangible investment returns (Vorasubin and 
Chareonngam 2007). Therefore, most intangible investments must be financed through internal funds such as 
retained earnings. Firms that face tighter financing constraints must rely more on internal funds (Fazzari and 
Peterson 1993). Inland firms rely more on internal funds for investment than coastal firms, and the sensitivity gap 
between inland and coastal firms widens under contractionary monetary policy (Sun and Yamori 2009). Inland firms 
find it more difficult to obtain outside funds, such as those from capital markets. Thus capital markets in China 
reflect regional institution disparities. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Firms that are better able to finance themselves have (a) a higher level of competitive advantage and 
(b) a higher level of sustained competitive advantage. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample 
 
For this study, we used all Chinese listed companies in the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database from 2000 to 2009. We excluded foreign-listed Chinese companies, Chinese mainland 
companies listed in the Hong Kong market, financial firms and firms with missing data. The final sample (balanced-
panel data) included 6,750 firm-year observations.  
 
Dependent variables 
 
We used firm-specific, abnormal profitability (Fijt) to measure competitive advantages. Abnormal profit is 
the difference between a firm’s ROA and its industry-median ROA (Jacobsen, 1988; Wu, et al. 2010). We used 
CSRC’s industry classification and divided the sample into 21 industries using the two-digit code for manufacturing 
and the one-digit code for nonmanufacturing industries. Fijt is attributed to a firm independent of industry structural 
characteristics (Acquaah 2003).  
 
Persistence of abnormal profitability (Фijt) is used to measure sustained competitive advantage; it is defined 
as the proportion of a firm’s abnormal profitability (Fijt) that persists systematically in any time before time t 
(Acquaah 2003, Mueller 1986). We use industry-adjusted return on assets (IROA) to calculate firm-specific 
abnormal profitability and 3-year-average IROA as persistence of firm-specific abnormal profitability (Acquaah 
2003, Mueller 1986). 
 
Independent variables 
 
We measure eligibility to access (ability) to initiate SEO using the approach suggested by Zou and Xiao 
(2006). We construct a dummy variable for each firm that satisfies all regulation criteria for SEO (E1), denoted as 1 
and 0. Amount obtained from equity (E2) is measured as Millions of Chinese Yuan value of net equity sales in the 
financial year.
2
  
 
We measure ability to issue bonds (B1) as a construct dummy variable based on screening of each firm’s 
regulatory criteria eligibility for issuing bonds, denoted 1 and 0. Amount obtained from bonds (B2) is measured as 
Millions of Chinese Yuan value of bonds sales in the financial year.
2
 
 
Ni et al. (2010) find that banks are more likely to grant loans to Chinese firms that have more tangible 
assets such as properties that can be mortgaged. The tangibility ratio (TAN) is used to measure a firm’s ability to 
obtain finance from commercial banks (L1; Ni et al.  2010). It computes as property, plant and equipment, and 
inventories divided by total assets. Amount obtained from bank loans (L2) is measured in Millions of Chinese Yuan 
value of bank loan obtained in the financial year (Li et al. 2008).
3
  
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2013 Volume 29, Number 4 
2013 The Clute Institute  Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 969 
Self-financing firms have advantages over competitors that have lesser self-financing ability; self-financing 
depends on retained earnings, and the retention rate (RET) can be used as a measure. RET is calculated as 1 minus 
the dividend pay-out ratio (I1). Amount retained from internally generated funds (I2) is measured in Millions of 
Chinese Yuan value of retained profit in the financial year. 
 
Control variables 
 
Firm size (SIZE) is measured in terms of the logarithm of total assets, while age (AGE) is measured as the 
number of years since incorporation. Financial leverage measures as the debt/equity ratio. The market-to-book value 
ratio (MBV) is also used as a control variable to capture growth prospects. Ownership type (OWN) is measured 
using a dummy variable; 1 if the largest controlling shareholder is the government, and 0 otherwise (privately owned) 
(Wu and Pangakar, 2010).
2
 Capital investment may impact on firm performance in short- and long-terms differently. 
Effective capital investment (CAPI) is measured by the asset turnover ratio (Vorasubin and Chareonngam, 2007). 
 
Politically strong firms can secure favorable regulatory conditions (Agrawal and Knoeber 2001). Previous 
China studies find that political links have positive effects (Berkman et. al. 2010, Fan et. al. 2008, Francis et. al. 
2009, Li et. al. 2008) and negative effects (Fan et. al. 2007, Yuan 2008) on performance and value. Following Fan et. 
al. (2007) and Wu et. al. (2010), we define a dummy variable, 1 if the firm has a politically connected chairman 
and/or CEO, and 0 otherwise.
2
 Regarding the requirements to access sources of financial capital, one major criterion 
is previous performance and other capabilities prior to accessing financial capital. We chose the time-lagged return 
on sales (ROS) because it is a less-biased measure and highly applicable to cross-sectional comparisons between 
firms with varying levels of assets intensity (Bettis 1981, Florin et. al. 2003, Wu and Cheng 2011).  
 
Industry type (IND) is measured as a categorical variable that represents industry classifications in 
accordance with CSRC. Annual market percentage for each industry segment measures the industry concentration 
(INCON) ratio (Acquaah 2003, Wu and Pangakar 2010). We followed Fan et. al. (2007) and Wu and Cheng (2011) 
in defining a dummy variable: 1 if the firm belongs to heavily regulated industries: natural resources, public utilities, 
finance, and real estate, and 0 otherwise. Institution factors (INS_FACTOR) is used to measure the effectiveness of 
regional institutional developments. INS_FACTOR is a marketization index used for capturing regional differences 
in the institutional environment (Chen et. al. 2009, Jin et. al. 2005, Wu et. al. 2010).  
 
RESULTS 
 
In assessing whether a firm meets the requisite regulation criteria, we manually filtered for the established 
regulations with very few exceptions caused by information limitations. For equity offerings, we excluded two 
qualitative regulatory requirements that specify that the issuing firm had no harmful related-party transactions with 
controlling shareholders and no public reprimands for exchanges over the previous year. For assessing eligibility to 
issue corporate bonds, we excluded one qualitative criterion: that the firm had not delayed payment of principal and 
interest on bonds or other debt. In determining eligibility to issue convertible bonds, we excluded two qualitative 
requirements: that the firm had no delayed payment of principal and interest on bonds or other debt, and no 
guarantees, litigation, arbitration, or other significant matters that seriously affect continuing operations.  
 
Table 2 shows the number and the percent of firms that met the eligibility regulation criteria of CSRC for 
access to right and public offerings of equity and issuance of convertible and non-convertible bonds in each year 
during the sample period.  These data also lend reliability to our selection procedure for ascertaining eligibility since 
change is very discernible in the number of eligible firms corresponding to the changes in regulations. The data 
show the dominance of the SOEs in terms of the number of firms eligible to issue securities under the CSRC 
regulations.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistic on the number of firms’ ability to access equity and bond 
Security Type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Ability to access rights offerings 212 
(31.36) 
244 
(36.19) 
241 
(35.71) 
260 
(38.48) 
258 
(38.36) 
209 
(31.06) 
257 
(38.12) 
264 
(39.20) 
256 
(37.88) 
240 
(35.65) 
Ability to access public equity offerings 460 
(68.20) 
405 
(59.98) 
39 
(5.80) 
34 
(5.15) 
37 
(5.54) 
42 
(6.36) 
201 
(29.70) 
230 
(34.05) 
223 
(33.16) 
204 
(30.23) 
Ability to access non-convertible corporate bond offerings 407 
(60.33) 
403 
(59.70) 
389 
(57.69) 
368 
(54.61) 
336 
(49.80) 
306 
(45.38) 
571 
(84.61) 
560 
(82.94) 
482 
(71.50) 
560 
(82.92) 
Ability to access convertible bond offerings 130 
(19.23) 
90 
(13.44) 
79 
(11.75) 
88 
(13.05) 
97 
(14.41 
93 
(13.82) 
274 
(40.65) 
256 
(37.99) 
238 
(35.36) 
219 
(32.49) 
Ability to access rights offerings- SOE 143 
(30.70) 
173 
(37.73) 
175 
(38.83) 
181 
(41.64) 
170 
(41.97) 
132  
(38.02) 
177 
(52.64) 
180 
(53.58) 
158 
(49.35) 
89 
(41.93) 
Ability to access rights offerings- PVT 69 
(35.19) 
71 
(40.55) 
66 
(38.96) 
79 
(40.32) 
88 
(40.59) 
77 
(36.19) 
80 
(35.78) 
84 
(35.84) 
98 
(39.81) 
151 
(40.26) 
Ability to access public equity offerings- SOE 339 
(71.32) 
295 
(60.32) 
30 
(6.31) 
24 
(5.42) 
26 
(5.96) 
26 
(6.44) 
136 
(33.83) 
154 
(38.64) 
134 
(35.14) 
74 
(30.18) 
Ability to access public equity offerings- PVT 121 
(60.74) 
110 
(59.11) 
09 
(4.55) 
10 
(4.57) 
11 
(4.76) 
16 
(6.23) 
65 
(24.04) 
76 
(27.45) 
89 
(30.56) 
130 
(30.27) 
Ability to access non-convertible corporate bond offerings- SOE 407 
(85.58) 
403 
(82.38) 
389 
(79.25) 
368 
(79.06) 
336 
(76.62) 
306 
(73.18) 
357 
(88.19) 
354 
(88.82) 
298 
(80.48) 
206 
(84.50) 
Ability to access non-convertible corporate bond offerings- PVT 
NA NA NA NA NA NA 
214 
(79.29) 
206 
(74.48) 
184 
(59.64) 
354 
(82.00) 
Ability to access convertible bond offerings- SOE 130 
(27.29) 
89 
(18.28) 
79 
(16.14) 
88 
(18.89) 
97 
(22.14) 
93 
(22.29) 
274 
(67.90) 
256 
(64.40) 
238 
(62.28) 
219 
(54.47) 
Ability to access convertible bond offerings- PVT 0 
(0.00) 
1  
(0.34) 
0 
(0.00) 
0 
(0.00) 
0 
(0.00) 
0 
(0.00) 
0 
(0.00) 
2 
(0.64) 
1 
(0.32) 
2 
(0.64) 
Notes: Percentage of firms is presented in parenthesis. SOE and PVT denote state-owned enterprises and private firms respectively. NA means not available for private firms due 
to regulatory restrictions by the CSRC.  
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Table 3.  Descriptive statistics on independent and control variables 
Firm Characteristic 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
Firm Age (AGE) – years 6.462 
(3.113) 
6.979 
(3.299) 
7.749 
(3.368) 
8.524 
( 3.430) 
9.279 
( 3.496) 
9.936 
(3.626) 
10.859 
(3.605) 
11.555 
(3.676) 
12.050 
(3.930) 
12.650 
(4.171) 
9.908 
(4.147) 
Firm size (SIZE) – Rmb 1,78 
(2,180) 
1,920 
( 2,630) 
2,190 
( 3,430) 
2,510 
( 3,960) 
2,850 
(4,620) 
2,970 
( 5,000) 
3,410 
( 6,080) 
4,340 
(7,520) 
4,910 
(8,590) 
5,660 
( 9,580) 
3,420 
(6,320) 
Leverage (LEV) 0.531 
(0.727) 
0.566 
(0.751) 
0.579 
(0 .721) 
0.613 
(0 .734) 
0.662 
(0.855) 
0.645 
(0 .896) 
0.621 
(0 .887) 
0.578 
( 0 .765) 
0.600 
( 0.802) 
0.591 
(0.848) 
0.601 
(0.808) 
Market-to-Book Ratio (MBV) 7.256 
(5.498) 
5.363 
(4.653) 
4.128 
( 4.139) 
3.198 
(3.468) 
2.547 
(2.857) 
1.990 
(2.751) 
3.036 
( 3.980) 
7.016 
( 6.111) 
2.757 
( 3.421) 
5.429 
(5.051) 
4.184 
(4.651) 
Tangibility Ratio (TAN) 0.422 
(0.166) 
0.428 
(0.174) 
0.439 
( 0.170) 
0.454 
( 0 .171) 
0.467 
(0 .166) 
0.487 
(0 .169) 
0.493 
(0.175) 
0.460 
(0 .180) 
0.469 
(0.178) 
0.452 
(0 .182) 
0.459 
(0 .175) 
Profitability (ROE) 0.037 
(0 .250) 
0.008 
(0.268) 
-0.002 
( 0.269) 
0.020 
(0 .222) 
-0.008 
(0.321) 
-0.026 
(0.332) 
0.026 
(0 .263) 
0.071 
( 0 .212) 
0.020 
(0.266) 
0.047 
(0.235) 
0.020 
(0.267) 
Past Performance (ROS) -0.270 
8.13 
0.086 
1.325 
-0.142 
3.03 
-0.143 
4.984 
-0.497 
4.37 
-0.460 
0.936 
-0.929 
5.513 
1.322 
20.36 
14.78 
55.47 
-0.277 
10.676 
13.88 
84.144 
Retention Rate (RETR) 1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
( 0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
Capital Investment (CAPI) 0.7383 0.7639 0.7889 0.7919 0.7443 1.6228 1.5803 2.7817 0.5489 0.6075 1.0968 
 (0.2821) (0.2918) (0.3014) (0.3025) (0.2843) (0.2843) (0.6218) (1.0626) (0.2096) (0.2321) (0.3872) 
State Ownership %  72.74 74.31 74.43 69.96 65.86 64.29 61.76 61.64 61.34 49.81 65.64 
Political connected % 31.10 33.66 33.76 38.06 40.24 36.88 35.87 35.31 34.90 34.68 35.70 
Competitive intensity 0.078 
(0.040) 
0.077  
(0.076) 
0.076 
(0.039) 
0.073 
(0.041) 
0.076 
(0.040) 
0.076 
(0.040) 
0.070 
(0.030) 
0.075 
(0.039) 
0.126 
(0.171) 
0.074 
(0 .043) 
0.080 
(0 .067) 
Regulated industries % 20.87 20.87 20.87 20.87 20.87 20.87 20.87 20.87 20.87 20.87 20.87 
Coastal Regions % 62.24 62.24 62.24 62.24 62.24 62.24 62.24 62.24 62.24 62.24 62.24 
Institutional factors 5.098 
(1.309) 
5.827 
(1.759) 
6.300 
(1.860) 
6.860 
(1.950) 
7.438 
(1.908) 
8.035 
(1.904) 
8.419 
(1.960) 
8.919 
(2.10) 
8.989 
(2.10) 
8.989 
(2.10) 
7.474 
2.324 
Amount financed by Equity– 
Rmb 
65.5 
(204) 
68.1 
(231) 
24.6 
(122) 
16.3 
(102) 
20.2 
(318) 
0.48 
(0.10) 
92.8 
(932) 
160 
(100) 
154 
(734) 
113 
(766) 
71.5 
(570) 
Amount financed by Bonds – 
Rmb 
6.87 
(140) 
0 
(0) 
20.0 
(288) 
291 
(232) 
151 
(177) 
6.63 
(1.56) 
6.5 
(156) 
148 
(160) 
1440 
(1080) 
29.9 
(163) 
506 
(633) 
Amount financed by bank loan 
– Rmb  
16.0 
(103) 
23.9 
(165) 
55.1 
(404) 
31.8 
(125) 
59.3 
(676) 
40.4 
(664) 
67.7 
(112) 
90.4 
(109) 
127 
(110) 
182 
(124) 
69.3 
(795) 
Internally generated funds – 
Rmb 
59.4 
(202) 
32.5 
(249) 
30.5 
(316) 
76.6 
(391) 
98.3 
(495) 
112 
(579) 
148 
(760) 
300 
(106) 
306 
(135) 
442 
(142) 
160 
(814) 
 Notes: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Firm size is in millions Rmb and all other RMB figures are in 100 millions. 
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Table 4. Correlations among variables 
Panel A: Correlation between independent variables 
   
          
  Fijt Фijt E1 B1 L1 I1 E2 B2 L2 
Ability to access to Equity (E1) 0.343* 0.410* 
       Ability to access to Bonds (B1) 0.192* 0.245* 0.176* 
      Ability to access to bank loan (L1) 0.002 -0.006 0.043* 0.071* 
     Ability to generate internal capital (I1) 0.012 0.002 0.013 -0.019* 0.005 
    Amount financed by Equity (E2) 0.029* 0.060* 0.051* 0.056* 0.020* 0.005 
   Amount financed by Bonds (B2) 0.002 0.009 0.047* 0.022* 0.021* -0.001 0.021* 
  Amount financed by bank loan (L2) 0.016 0.021* 0.023* 0.014 0.020* 0.004 0.027* 0.026* 
 Firm's internally generated funds (I2) 0.252* 0.194* 0.120* 0.129* 0.005 0.008 0.277* 0.047* 0.018* 
Panel B: Correlation between firm-level variables 
           Fijt Фijt 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
 1. Firm age -0.065* -0.067* 
       2. Firm size 0.148* 0.234* 0.038* 
      3. Ownership 0.016 0.028* -0.256* 0.154* 
     4. Political connection -0.011 -0.016 0.033* 0.031* -0.024* 
    5. Leverage -0.164* -0.195* 0.016 0.016 -0.006 0.007 
   6. Growth opportunities (MBV) 0.077* 0.068* -0.005 0.020* 0.020* -0.005 -0.162* 
  7. Capital investment (CAPI) 0.041* 0.072* 0.106* -0.103* 0.022 0.032 -0.029 0.322* 
 8. Past performance (1-year lag ROS) 0.013 0.040* 0.002 -0.104* -0.015 -0.009 -0.002 0.002 
 9. Past performance (3-year ave. lag ROS) 0.017 0.048* 0.002 -0.102* -0.015 -0.009 -0.002 0.002 
 Panel C: Correlation between industry-level and institutional variables 
        Fijt Фijt 9. 10. 
     10. Competitive intensity -0.018* 0.011 
       11.Regulated industry -0.038* -0.048* 0.044* 
      12. Institutional factors 0.035* 0.066* 0.047* 0.010 
     Note: Fijt and Фijt denote competitive advantage and sustained competitive advantage respectively. * Indicates significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 5. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) examining impact of ability to access sources of capital on competitive and sustained competitive advantages 
 
Competitive Advantage (IROA) Sustained Competitive Advantage (3-year average IROA) 
Variables Model 1A Model 2A Model 3A Model 4A Model 1B Model 2B Model 3B Model 4B 
Constant -0.2210*** -0.1582*** -0.1221*** -0.0753** -0.3357*** -0.3014*** -0.3067*** -0.2753*** 
 
(0.0369) (0.0314) (0.0298) (0.0253) (0.0323) (0.0285) (0.0321) (0.0246) 
Firm age -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 
 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Firm size 0.0093*** 0.0053*** 0.0056*** 0.0021* 0.0142*** 0.0119*** 0.0128*** 0.0108*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Ownership -0.0035+ -0.0172*** -0.0035+ -0.0166*** -0.0024 -0.0119*** -0.0024 -0.0118*** 
 
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Political connection -0.0046* -0.0025+ -0.0051** -0.0029+ -0.0044** -0.0033* -0.0047** -0.0035* 
 
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) 
Leverage -0.0041*** -0.0026*** -0.0039*** -0.0026*** -0.0045*** -0.0038*** -0.0045*** -0.0037*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Growth opportunities (MBV) 0.0206*** 0.0183*** 0.0191*** 0.0170*** 0.0085*** 0.0071*** 0.0081*** 0.0067*** 
 
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Capital Investment (CAPI) 0.0055 0.0052 0.0062 0.0071 0.0012 0.0014 0.0021 0.0038 
 
(0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0012) 
Past performance (1-year lag ROS) 0.0003 0.0004 0.0008 0.0008 
    
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
    Past performance (3-year average lag ROS) 
    
0.0002+ 0.0002+ 0.0002* 0.0002* 
     
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Competitive intensity -0.0273* -0.0246+ -0.0327* -0.0299* -0.0003 0.0017 -0.0021 0.0002 
 
(0.0132) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0126) (0.0082) (0.0079) (0.0082) (0.0079) 
Regulated industry -0.0060 -0.0185 0.0031 -0.0006 0.0047 -0.0045 0.0064 -0.0049 
 
(0.0291) (0.0243) (0.0196) (0.0161) (0.0267) (0.0231) (0.0252) (0.0164) 
Institutional factors 0.0021*** 0.0012* 0.0019** 0.0011* 0.0016** 0.0010+ 0.0015** 0.0010+ 
 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Ability to access to Equity (E1) 
 
0.0341*** 
 
0.0326*** 
 
0.0217*** 
 
0.0213*** 
  
(0.00169) 
 
(0.00165) 
 
(0.0011) 
 
(0.0011) 
Ability to access to Bonds (B1) 
 
0.0335*** 
 
0.0324*** 
 
0.0253*** 
 
0.0250*** 
  
(0.0022) 
 
(0.0021) 
 
(0.0014) 
 
(0.0014) 
Ability to access to bank loan (L1) 
 
0.0047 
 
0.0031 
 
0.0100** 
 
0.0092* 
  
(0.0051) 
 
(0.0051) 
 
(0.0037) 
 
(0.0037) 
Ability to generate internal capital (I1) 
  
0.0388*** 0.0362*** 
  
0.0124*** 0.0106*** 
   
(0.0021) (0.0019) 
  
(0.0013) (0.0013) 
N 6750 6750 6750 6750 6750 6750 6750 6750 
Log restricted-likelihood 8968.39 9264.33 9125.67 9410.74 11811.07 12136.24 11837.36 12153.31 
Wald chi2 742.37*** 1586.79*** 1135.35*** 2003.16*** 825.00*** 1703.24*** 922.05*** 1791.16*** 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. +, *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 level respectively.  
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Table 6. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) examining impact of amount financed by sources of capital on competitive and sustained competitive advantages 
 
Competitive Advantage (IROA) Sustained Competitive Advantage (3-year average IROA) 
Variables Model 1A Model 2A Model 3A Model 4A Model 1B Model 2B Model 3B Model 4B 
Constant -0.2212*** -0.2223*** -0.1160*** -0.1334*** -0.3350*** -0.3251*** -0.3060*** -0.3041*** 
 
(0.0369) (0.0372) (0.0351) (0.0352) (0.0323) (0.0283) (0.0321) (0.0281) 
Firm age -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Firm size 0.0094*** 0.0094*** 0.0056*** 0.0065*** 0.0142*** 0.0142*** 0.0128*** 0.0132*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Ownership -0.0035+ -0.0035+ -0.0035+ -0.0034+ -0.0024 -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0025 
 
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Political connection -0.0046* -0.0046* -0.0051** -0.0052** -0.0044** -0.0045** -0.0047** -0.0047** 
 
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Leverage -0.0041*** -0.0041*** -0.0040*** -0.0040*** -0.0046*** -0.0046*** -0.0045*** -0.0045*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Growth opportunities (MBV) 0.0206*** 0.0206*** 0.0191*** 0.0190*** 0.0085*** 0.0085*** 0.0080*** 0.0080*** 
 
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Capital Investment (CAPI) 0.0054 0.0052 0.0062 0.0071 0.0012 0.0014 0.0021 0.0038 
 
(0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0012) 
Past performance (1-year lag ROS) 0.0004 0.0004 0.0008 0.0008 
    
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
    Past performance (3-year average lag ROS) 
    
0.0002+ 0.0002+ 0.0002* 0.0002* 
     
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Competitive intensity -0.0273* -0.0262* -0.0327* -0.0270* -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0021 -0.0001 
 
(0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0082) 
Regulated industry -0.0060 -0.0041 -0.0139 -0.0142 0.0047 -0.0038 0.0020 -0.0039 
 
(0.0291) (0.0278) (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0267) (0.0193) (0.0264) (0.0191) 
Institutional factors 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0019** 0.0019** 0.0016** 0.0016** 0.0016** 0.0015** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Amount financed by Equity (E2) 
 
0.0079*** 
 
0.0068*** 
 
0.0042* 
 
0.0166* 
  
(0.0001) 
 
(0.0001) 
 
(0.0001) 
 
(0.0001) 
Amount financed by Bonds (B2) 
 
-0.0001 
 
-0.0001 
 
-0.0011 
 
-0.0012 
  
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
Amount financed by bank loan (L2) 
 
0.0008 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0019+ 
 
0.0026+ 
  
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
Firm's internally generated funds (I2) 
  
0.0014*** 0.0016*** 
  
0.0007*** 0.0007*** 
   
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
  
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
N 6750 6750 6750 6750 6750 6750 6750 6750 
Log restricted-likelihood 8968.39 8937.87 9104.94 9089.92 11811.06 11779.56 11816.64 11787.36 
Wald chi2 742.37*** 744.52*** 1035.35*** 946.52*** 825.00*** 827.96*** 824.21*** 826.42*** 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. +, *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 level respectively.  
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Table 3 shows the mean and standard deviation of control and independent variables. Financial leverage 
also rose from 53% in 2000 to 59% in 2009, and averaged about 60%. This suggests that average debt as a percent 
of total assets was about 38%. Market-to-book ratio varied substantially, suggesting volatility in growth prospects. 
Tangibility, which shows the tangible assets as a proportion of total assets, averaged about 46% and showed a slight 
increase over time. Thus, the ability of firms to use tangible assets as collateral to obtain bank financing was fairly 
stable during the sample period. Profitability also varied with an average of just 2%, implying that, on average, 
Chinese companies have not been very profitable.  
 
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of the variables included in the regressions. The 
variance inflation factors (VIF) are below 2, which shows that multicollinearity is not a serious concern. 
Furthermore, we find some preliminary evidence suggesting that all four financing variables show positive 
associations with competitive and sustained competitive advantages.  
 
 We employed hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to separate regional and industry effects from the 
hypothesized firm effects. HLM provides a better way to examine data with hierarchically nested structures 
(Hofmann 1997). Table 5 presents the HLM regression output for the relationships between ability to access various 
sources of financial capital and competitive and sustained competitive advantages.  
 
Table 5 shows that firm size, growth opportunities, and institutional factor index positively affect (p <0.001) 
competitive and sustained-competitive advantages. Firm ownership type (p <0.1), political connection (p <0.05), 
leverage (p <0.001), and competitive intensity (p<0.05) negatively influence advantages. Access to all external 
sources of financial capital: ability to offer equity and issuance of bonds (except ability to access to bank finance) 
are positively related (p <0.001) to advantages. These results support hypotheses 1a, and 2a. Access to all external 
sources of financial capital―ability to offer equity, issuance of bonds, and accessibility to bank loan―is related 
positively (p <0.001) to sustained competitive advantage. As indicated in model 3, the ability to generate internal 
capital is related positively (p <0.001) to competitive and sustained competitive advantages.  
 
Amount financed by equity and internally generated funds are related positively (p <0.001) to competitive 
advantage. All external sources of financial capital―amount financed by equity, and bank loan (excluding amount 
financed by bonds) - are related positively (p <0.001) to sustained competitive advantage. As indicated in model 3 of 
Table 6, the amount to generated by internal funds is related positively (p <0.001) to competitive and sustained 
competitive advantages.  
 
 We take steps to alleviate endogeneity problem. We specify lagged models, as suggested by Bromiley 
(1991). We use measures from previous year (t-1) as the predictor variables while using industry-adjusted 
profitability (IROA) to measure competitive advantage. Bromiley (1991) suggested a one-year lag structure that 
subsequent researchers have followed (Tan 2003, Wu et al. 2010). We used size at the beginning of the year to 
control economics of scale or size effect (Tan 2003, Wu et  al. 2010). We added lag ROS to the models to control 
for the potential endogeneity and reverse causality (Heckman and Borjas 1980, Wu et. al 2010). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
We focus on China for this study and contribute to the RBV and IBV literatures by examining access to 
sources of financial capital on competitive and sustained competitive advantages, recognizing that China’s 
underdeveloped and highly regulated market means that regions vary in institutional sources of financial capital. We 
study the influence of regulations and institutional developments that lead firms to seek various sources of financial 
capital and thus contribute to growing research concerning a little-understand topic: entrepreneurial resource 
accumulation and exploitation during the transition (Meyer 2001, Meyer and Peng, 2005).  
 
We present evidence that governmental agencies must be aware of the impacts of their policies on the 
development and competiveness of different types of firms. Firms must have access to financial resources if they are 
to modernize their operations, so policymakers must continue developing relevant institutions and relaxing 
regulations to make the market more transparent and reduce transaction costs. Such developments could eradicate 
existing discrimination conferred by regulations and institutional factors. Peng (2002) points out that no firm is 
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immune to the institutional frameworks embedded within it. Hence, researchers must study the intricacies of 
institutional frameworks: how, under what circumstances, to what extent, and in what ways they matter (Powell 
1996). Our study contributes empirically to the literature by showing how and to what extent institutional and 
regulatory frameworks matter in allowing access to sources of capital and competitive advantage. 
 
This study is significant for several reasons. First, it addresses the literature’s failure to consider effects of 
financial resources on competitive and sustained competitive advantages in a tightly regulated institutional 
environment. Second, results support strategy scholars in arguing the importance of resources, and, in this instance, 
the accessibility to sources of financial capital and effects on sustained outcomes (Acquaah 2003, Barney 1991). 
Third, the access to different sources of financial capital may not affect competitive advantage in developed markets, 
unlike China’s. Our study empirically supports Collis and Montgomery (1995) and Peng et al.’s (2009) argument 
that RBV does not pay adequate attention to context. 
 
The results demonstrate that highly regulated markets significantly discriminate against some firms in their 
need to access financial capital. Furthermore, the results complement empirical studies on RBV that investigate 
firm-specific effects under tight regulations and institutional theory indicating that institutional environments inhibit 
some firms from accessing external financing. Findings suggest that imperfections in policy-driven capital and 
underdeveloped bond markets, implies uncollateralize external financial capital is less accessible. Those firms are 
unable to access equity and bond capital due to high information and operational costs. Furthermore, Chinese firms 
highly depend on bank loans; most interest expenses are not much different among firms in the short-term.  
 
Internally generated capital is also important for exacting competitive advantages. However, internally 
generated capital yields less than externally financed capital and, as a whole, yields little significant advantage. Our 
descriptive analysis is found that, on average, Chinese companies have not been very profitable. Internally generated 
funds are insufficient to finance growth and new investment in most Chinese firms. Ayyagari et al. (2010) and Cull 
et al. (2009) find that highly profitable private firms can finance growth solely through retained earnings and their 
findings explain why internally generated capital yields little significant advantage. 
 
We find that large firms have greater access to external financing, but small firms cannot afford to do so. 
Some researchers argue that formal financing development positively impacts small firms (Beck et al. 2007, Beck et 
al. 2005). Others argue that formal financing development assists only large firms (Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990). 
Findings support that formal financing development assists large firms, but reforms are inadequate and Chinese 
capital and debt markets are still highly regulated, which lessens support for small firms. Small firms cannot fulfill 
CSRC regulations for eligibility to access capital and debts markets and are also hurt the most because underlying 
weaknesses in the institutional environment make it difficult for them to access financing.  
 
Government ownership and political connection negatively affect competitive advantage. SOEs 
demonstrate that they have preferential access to equity and bonds capital. Competitive intensity affects competitive 
advantage negatively because increasing industry concentration leads to highly competitive access to different 
sources of financial capital in short-run. However, it does not affect sustained competitive advantage, because 
industry concentration is saturated in the long-run. Regional institutional development positively affects competitive 
and sustained competitive advantages because firms in highly developed regions have more favorable access to 
external sources of financial capital than firms in less-developed regions.  
 
Limitations 
 
This research has inherent limitations that suggest pathways for future research. Access to equity and bonds 
in China is hampered because of strict regulations in enterprise financing. Further research is needed to examine 
contextual robustness.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Access to internal and external financing offers distinct advantages in China’s highly regulated, unequally 
developed market. Firms that can easily access external financing enjoy short-term competitive advantages and 
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sustained competitive advantages over others that lack such abilities. Equity and internally generated capital confer 
competitive advantage, and equity, bank loans, and internally generated capital give sustained competitive 
advantage.  In China’s tightly regulated market with disparity in institutional development among regions, firms 
with access to sources of external financial capital have competitive advantages over firms that must rely on 
internally generated capital. 
 
Strict regulations and institutional development disparities give some Chinese firms advantages in 
accessing needed capital. CSRC should regulate Chinese SEO and debt markets minimally with respect to access to 
equity, bonds, and especially eligibility regulations. However, CSRC must provide timely and accurate information, 
monitor activities, and punish firms that engage in fraudulent activities. These changes would reduce financial 
constraints, encourage investment in viable projects, reduce financing costs, encourage easy access to optimum 
capital structures, affect growth prospects, enhance competitiveness, and upgrade and secure long-term corporate 
sustainability.  
 
Self-financing capability is also important for conveying competitive advantages, especially, they lack in 
access to sources of external financial capital. China’s existing financial industry reforms benefit large privately 
owned firms and government-owned firms whatever the size.  Institutional developments in regions are helpful for 
access to sources of external financial capital. In this context, policymakers should focus attention on further 
reforms to mobilize external financial resources for small and private firms and progress of institutional 
development in less-developed inland regions. 
 
NOTES 
 
1.   Security regulations in developed and free markets are divided into (a) discloser duties, (b) restrictions on 
fraud and manipulation, (c) restrictions on insider trading. Disclosure requirements reduce the cost of 
searching for information; restrictions on fraud and manipulation lower costs of verifying the credibility of 
information; and restrictions on insider trading protect investors from insiders recouping investments. The 
Chinese stock market functions differently from mature market economies because of administrator 
interventions (Bo, Huang, & Wang, 2011). 
2. We obtained equity, bond, bank loan data, and financial data from China Listed Firms’ Seasonal Equity 
Offering Database, China Bond Market Research Database and Stock Market Financial Statements 
Database in CSMAR data series. We manually collected ownership data before 2003 and political 
connection data from annual company reports. 
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